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ABSTRACT
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) provide conditional terms which regulate investments between two countries, and are used as a tool for economic 
growth by attracting external investments. However, some countries claim BITs are a threat to economic and social policies. Furthermore, BITs play 
a role as a legal cover for unconditional protection for Multinational Companies (MNCs), without linking the terms of protection to any party on the 
MNCs side. Thus, no provisions deal with acts or the very idea of corruption, or refer to the state’s right to safeguard public money and maintaining 
sovereignty, which become overruled under international arbitration. With a broad definition for “investor,” the question of who gets protection under 
the treaty is not strictly answered. Upon signing a treaty, the investors (signing party) already present in a country (with whom their state signed a BIT), 
and potential future investors, become protected under the terms of the treaty. This article addresses the very question on whether BITs are a safe haven 
for encroachments by MNCs, through literature review and various cases that exhibit abuse of BITs in the respective host state. This article provides 
an understanding as to why BITs are considered a safe haven for the MNCs.
Keywords: Multinational Corporations, Arbitration, Human Rights, Bilateral 
JEL Classifications: C610, C623, I23
1. INTRODUCTION
The world is seeing significant changes in the last few decades, in 
outside ventures, particularly in foreign direct investment (FDI). 
Generally, peregrine ventures are started by arrangements between 
the peregrine organizations or speculators in the host nation. Such 
a common and two-sided assertion is a tying bond between the 
parties involved (Dolzer and Stevens, 1995). This understanding 
or agreement enables those organizations through this linking 
channel connection to penetrate the business sectors of remote or 
host countries. At the present time, probably the most competent 
and strongest agents on the world stage are not mandatorily 
administrations, but rather business substances and aggregates. 
For instance, in 2011, oil and gas behemoth ExxonMobil incited 
incomes of US$467 billion, which is the measure of Norway’s 
whole economy. Another case, Walmart, the world’s third-most 
cosmically colossal entity with more than 2 million specialists, has 
a workforce that is close to the militaries of the United States and 
China in size. Various economical associations continue running 
with the thought for the sulubrity of the all-inclusive community 
whose lives they contact physically. Regardless, those who are 
cumbersome and execute misleading associations and infringed 
on human rights conventions, thus on the harm the gatherings 
around them, their workers, and even the organizations under 
which they work. Do not understand. While keeping multinational 
companies’ (MNCs) duties toward the approvals and plans on 
human rights, these associations hold to bilateral investment 
treaties (BIT) to protect their business and excitement, actuating 
a dark illicit framework to skip from its commitment.
The U.N. conference on trade and development (UNCTAD) 
affirmed that the speculation procurements in organized commerce 
acquiescence oblige the administration’s ability to work for her 
occupants, and informs that BITs were the real reason abruptly 
jumping into instances of worldwide mediation (UNCTAD, 2015). 
The report coordinated that 68% of nations experiencing the 
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implicative hints of worldwide mediation were creating nations. 
BITs, office to authorize nations to stand the tenets is underscored 
as unjust conditions put by different organizations or nations to 
rampart their speculations or else get to be debilitated to be liable 
to worldwide discretion. While in 2014, 60% of all bodies of 
evidence were brought against creating and moving economies 
and the remaining 40% were against creating nations. The part of 
bodies of evidence against creating nations was 47 for each penny 
in 2013 (UNCTAD, 2015), as appeared in Figure 1 underneath.
As of now, there are around 3000 universal arrangements that have 
a procurement that endorses MNCs to sue apropos administrations. 
Out of these, 2700 are BITs. Such arrangements have traversed 
quickly around the globe since the 1990s. From that point 
forward, more than 100 distinct nations have been sued more 
than 550 times. Interestingly, the majority of these nations are 
creating nations. The U.S., what’s more, Canada, have been sued 
under NAFTA; yet, intriguingly, Western European nations have 
been sued just a couple times and Japan has never been sued. This 
exploration has accumulated a database of 360 cases, in which 
we can learn what unfolds, starting in 2012. Of these, the state 
won 34% of the time.
The MNC won 31% of the time (Allee and Peinhardt, 2014). The 
case settled before achieving the last judgment 34% of the time, 
which legal counselors celebrate of as a win for the MNC (Hang, 
2014). By the end of 2014, the overall number of concluding cases 
reached 356. Out of these, approximately 37% (132 cases) by the 
discontinuance of 2014, the general number of finishing up cases 
reached 356. Out of these, roughly 37% (132 cases) were ruled for 
the State, and 25% (87 cases) finished for the financial specialist. 
Roughly 28% of cases (101) were settled and 8% of cases (29) 
were ended for reasons other than settlement (or for obscure 
reasons). In the remaining 2% (seven cases) an arrangement break 
was found; however, no fiscal payment was recompensed to the 
financial specialist.
Today, as organizations win billions in harms, insiders verbally 
express it has become unsafely crazy. Following 2000, many 
peregrine financial specialists have sued more than a moiety 
of the world’s nations; asserting harms for an extensive variety 
of administration activities that they verbally express have 
undermined their benefits. In 2006, Ecuador crossed out an 
oil-investigation contract with Houston-predicated Occidental 
Petroleum; in 2012, after occidental documented a suit up to a 
universal venture tribunal, Ecuador was definitively commanded 
to pay a record $1.8bn - generally indistinguishable equivalent 
to the nation’s wellbeing spending plan for a year. Ecuador, as 
indicated by Kennard (2015), has held up a solicitation for the 
choice to be invalidated (Bastagli, 2015).
For the past fifteen years, there have been increased cases of 
termination agreement between different parties this has led to 
increased demand of the BITs and thus they have come to full 
existence in the world of business (Vandevelde, 2005). Due to 
the increased termination cases since the early 18th century, it 
has called for intrusion by the BITs to help regulate and control 
the agreement between the MNCs and the host countries. In 
most cases, BITs concentrate on protection of the investors. 
The international law gives the investors favour as compared 
to the host countries. The earliest era of BITs started in the late 
18th century (Vandevelde, 2005). This was the period referred to 
as the pre-colonial era. This period continued until to the end of 
World War II. It was later affected during the 19th century where 
it saw some improvements in the authorities of the BITs. This era 
continued until late 1990 where it ended with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. The third era of the regime of the BITs began in 
approximately 1990 (Bastagli, 2015). It holds until present. This 
era is referred to as the Global Era (Vandevelde, 2005). It is marked 
by empowering the BITs, who are given power even more that the 
MNCs and the nationalities which are engaged in the agreement. 
The bits are expected to regulate and protect the MNCs and other 
international investors.
2. RELEVANT THEORIES
In reality, the BITs are one of the most important means 
of regulating the liberated investment mechanisms in the 
contemporary time (Allee and Peinhardt, 2014). While MNCs are 
Figure 1: Known ISDS cases, annual and cumulative (1987-2014)
Source: UNCTAD, ISDS database
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the clearest form of growing economic liberalization (Blomstrom, 
2014). Principally, the paper relies on explaining the BITs to MNCs 
on the economic liberalism theory that emerged as a critique of 
mercantilism (Hirst, 2013). As a developing vendor class tested 
the force of the European rulers in the 18th century, liberal political 
scholars, prominently John Locke dismissed the Hobbesian 
idea of an absolutist state and contended that the state existed 
exclusively to advance individual freedom. Liberal economists, 
especially Adam Smith and David Ricardo, tried to establish that 
free markets, liberated by state regulation, would bring about the 
best flourishing for all (Vandevelde, 1997). In their perspective, the 
state’s part ought to be constrained to ensuring private privileges 
of property and contract (Rubin, 1994) and amending any failure 
in the market (Frieden and Lake, 2002). Progressivism tries to 
protect the business sector from legislative issues and supports 
a self-governing lawful framework to ensure private property 
against state obstruction and to implement expected (Paul and 
Amawi, 2013) trades in the business sector. Liberal financial 
matters, as created by Smith and Ricardo, pushed an approach 
of organized commerce that allows every state to work in the 
generation of merchandise and administrations in which it has a 
relative favorable position, and after that exchange its items for 
others that it needs yet can’t deliver as proficiently (Södersten 
and Reed 1994). Through financial aspects of specialization and 
scale, a state is able to identify its profitability. The progressivism 
of the MNCs has been connected with an arrangement of fair 
drove development strategies to facilitate the growth in the new 
investment regions (Rapley, 1997). Progressivism additionally 
has advanced the free flow of capital cross different countries 
(Tolometi, 2015).
Imperfect market theory states that if one nation stops trading 
with other countries, then there is no international trade (Bastagli, 
2015). From the statistics done by many economy analysts in 
various nations is that the theory greatly influences the status 
of the BITs. If then the countries have to trade, there should be 
governance among them and that is why the BITs come in. The 
investors in other nations need protection from the host government 
and the only way this can be offered is through the authorities 
emphasizing on it through BITs. If there is no international trade, 
then the existence of the BITs becomes limited as what will be 
their responsibility (Bastagli, 2015). BITs, in the more extensive 
response, leads to the widened creation of trust among the parties 
as they seek to practice and follow set regulations as stated by the 
international law (Vandevelde, 2005).
The theory of liberalism economics is also a part of the BITs 
responsibilities because the multinational company has to make 
decision pertaining to it and therefore the host government should 
not interfere with that freedom (Rossman and Helpman, 1991). 
BITs ensure that the MNCs is given freedom to practice their 
rights when it comes to this sector of decision making. Some local 
investors or the local government might attempt to interfere with 
the way the multinational organizations perform their practices, 
and thus the BITs will have to protect the MNCs from such 
exploitation (Pesaran and Shin, 1999). The theory expounds on 
the efficiency of liberalization on economics and the importance of 
it being well catered for and handled effectively in any economy. 
International trade is prominently affected by such malpractices 
and thus there is a need to regulate this.
Marxist economics theory majors on the role of the investors in 
relation to the productivity and labor approach (Subramanian 
and Shang-Jin, 2007). It explains the factors the investors should 
observe when it comes to productivity and labor as they are major 
factors of the production should be facilitated (Stiglitz, 2007). It 
also stretches to the surplus productivity and also nature and origin 
of the economic value as the investors would want it. Economic 
evolution is also evaluated in this theory and how the MNCs should 
engage the BITs to help them regulate their practices. Marx’s 
theory states that value of a commodity is socially necessary 
labor time that has been invested in it. The BITs then support the 
efficiency as stated by the economic status of the country in which 
the MNC is investing (Dhooge, 2001).
In addition, economic nationalism is also a part of BITs’ factors of 
consideration during its formulations. Nationalities have different 
policies that are initiated in the economic aspect of the country. 
Therefore, when a MNC identifies that it wants to adverse its 
operations to other countries, then it has to consider the policies 
of its country and the policies of the country into which it wants 
to extent its operations. Economic nationalism also engages the 
transfer of goods, labor, and also capital (Rossman and Helpman, 
1991). Different regions have different policies and therefore the 
policies apply differently depending on different regions.
3. BITs AND INVESTORS’ PROTECTION
A comprehensive multilateral set of investment rules has never 
been conclusively established. It was due to this that multiple 
failures in developing a multilateral investment treaty prompted 
developed countries to initiate efforts by negotiating BITs with 
individual developing country (Guzman, 1997). Host countries 
sought to protect their respective interests by entering into bilateral, 
regional, and multilateral investment-related agreements. Today, 
there are many bits that have been established between developed 
and developing countries (Elkins et al., 2008). BITs are the most 
important sources of contemporary investment law (Schreuer, 
2009). The purpose of the BITs is to attract foreign investment by 
providing security to foreign investors; primarily in developing 
countries where fear of expropriation might otherwise deter 
investment. BITs exclusively govern the investment relations 
between two signatory countries. Zachary Elkins, et al. defines 
BITs as a treaty that is concluded between two countries designed 
to regulate investment between them. Evidently, BITs are seen as a 
fundamental legal mechanism that is pursued to protect FDI around 
the world. Its establishment helps to propel FDI and establish a 
broad set of investor’s rights and BITs. Such establishment protects 
investors’ interest and investment, and they may sue a host state 
in an international tribunal if these rights are violated, or for any 
disputes between them (Kerner, 2009).
Under the BITs, peregrine financial specialists are guaranteed 
sundry rights, including, however not compelled, to one side of 
payment in the event that the speculation is confiscated, a good fit 
for the peregrine venture to favorable procurements, ideal for the 
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speculation to be concurred support and security, and the peregrine 
speculators’ right to move capital and money starting with one 
nation then onto the next. In addition, BITs withal accommodate 
procedural rights that qualify peregrine financial specialists to 
sue the host state without looking for earlier assent from their 
home administrations (Blomstrom, 2014). One might verbalize 
that peregrine speculators procure locus stand to be subjects of 
worldwide law for purposes of venture mediation alone. This is 
verbalized to be the weightiest development brought by BITs 
(Gantz, 2003).
The support of peregrine speculators in the host nation is built 
up inside of the semi-institutionalized provision in BITs. There 
are three essential reasons that incentivize nations to ink a 
submissive with BITs. These include: Fore fending its nationals’ 
interests in the regions of different nations, changing the 
business sector; and advancing internal speculations (Salacuse 
and Sullivan, 2005).
Most partaking nations in FDI consider the financial specialists’ 
aegis of its nationals as a noteworthy objective while working 
together in the host nation (Stiglitz, 2007). Respective acquiescence 
would generally incorporate procurements of financial specialist 
support. As an outline of this, it is recommended that the general 
principle of treatment of peregrine ventures and financial specialist 
incorporate the following: Fair and impartial treatment for both 
the host investors and the multinational investors’ full aegis and 
security, intransigent or unfair measures, expropriation, and 
dispossession should always be abandoned and undertaken within 
the treaties. Intimacy of either the BITs or MNCs’ rights should 
never be exposed and the relationship between the two should 
always be held to standards (Vandevelde, 1998).
Countries are still in search for more competent BITs. In the 
year 2014, 31 BITs were concluded. Canada was considered to 
be the most active country in the year 2014. By the end of the 
year, the world had grown to 3271 treaties that implies that the 
MNCs have grown interest and have realized that the importance 
of them being in BITs. During the formulation of the BITs the 
parties engaged formulate policies that are tied toward achieving 
specific goals. More than fifty countries in the year 2014 were 
engaged in reviewing their BITs to make their conditions suitable 
for all other multinational corporations that might be willing to 
enter the international market. Moreover business is changing and 
therefore some of the policies need adjustments (UNCTAD, 2015). 
Most of the countries in the year 2014 had to terminate their BITs 
to formulate new suitable international investment treaties such 
as South Africa and Indonesia. Pre-establishment commitments 
are included in a relatively small but growing number of BITs. 
Some 228 treaties now have been formulated to provide national 
treatment for the acquisition or establishment of investments 
(Baykitch, 2011). It mostly involved nations such as the United 
States, Canada, Finland, Japan, and the EU, but a few developing 
countries (Chile, Costa Rica, the Republic of Korea, Peru and 
Singapore) also follow this path. It implicates that the regions and 
countries have realized the importance of the BITs because it can 
save them and help control the trade between host countries and 
the international investors.
Most of the countries’ investment policy measures continue to be 
geared significantly toward investment liberalization, promotion, 
and facilitation of the international trade (Blomstrom, 2014). In 
2014, more than 80% of BITs aimed to improve entry conditions 
and reduce restrictions (Stiglitz, 2007). A focus was investment 
facilitation and sector-specific liberalization for most of the 
nation’s willing to engage in international trade. New investment 
restrictions related mostly to national security concerns and 
strategic industries (Stiglitz, 2007).
3.1. Significance of the BITs
From the different studies that have been aligned and proven to 
be prolific by the Karl Sauvant and Lisa Sachs, significance of 
the BITs differs from one nation to the other depending on the 
demands of the parties to be engaged; that is the host nation and 
the origin of the investor. The application of the BIT should be 
econometric because it should apply technically. They impacted 
that many researchers apply different methodologies and that is 
why there different applications of the BITs for the multinational 
investors. In general, the two categorical classifications of the 
significances are substantive protection and dispute settlement.
3.2. Substantive Protection
BITs ensure that the MNCs is treated equally as the other local 
companies and other MNCs. They are equally protected or more 
favorite. BITs ensure that the zone is a non-discrimination trade 
zone and no mishandling occurs. The annexes or the protocols 
of the agreement BITs make sure that they are followed and no 
misappropriation takes place. Before making the investment, even 
after making the investment all through the investment, BITs 
perform their duties as it was stated in the agreement (Hang, 2014).
BITs cumulatively state the limits of expropriation of investment 
and therefore allow the investors and give then the authority 
to demand compensation whenever such occasions occur. 
Expropriation is only determined under the law of the international 
standards as is a wide range that attributes to many factors. 
Any factor that seeks to deprive the value of the investment 
per the investor should then be considered a responsibility of 
the BITs to regulate it. Expropriation isn’t only limited to the 
physical undertakings, but also engages different intermediate 
factors influencing the investors’ economic stand (Pesaran and 
Shin, 1999).
It is BITs responsibility to overview all the agreements that were 
signed for are well followed and they are keenly observed (Hang, 
2014). For start, the host countries promise that they will provide 
fair and equitable treatment that then should be observed all during 
the investment period. The hosts also promise they will provide 
full protection and security and also not engage in arbitrary and 
discriminatory decision-making practices (Swenson, 2008). It is 
the BITs responsibility to make sure that all of these are observed. 
BITs monitor all the progress to the termination of the investment 
period. Another benefit related to BITs is that one can turn to the 
standard gravity model of trade and thus compare the economic 
effects of BITs with the policy effects of other trade institutions, 
such as the WTO, regional trade agreements, or generalized system 
of preferences.
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It is the responsibility of the BITs to allow the international 
investors to move funds in and out of the host country without any 
restriction by use of the market exchange rates (Bastagli, 2015). 
All transfers pertaining to the investment are thus regulated and 
authenticated by BITs. Ensuring that there is efficient transfer of 
funds justifies the investors of the likelihood of positive growth 
within the market guided by the BITs (Stiglitz, 2007).
BITs ensure that the investors are not exploited by the host nations 
in areas such as forcing them to engage in inefficient and distorting 
practices (Swenson, 2008). Investors who are under the protection 
of BITs can engage in any transaction provided it is listed and 
allowed by the assigned BITs. They are eligible for transactions 
of any type if and if only legible. Exportation and importation 
of any commodity or services is allowed by the BITs, therefore 
restricting or prohibiting them will be a form of rights violation 
(Swenson, 2008).
BITs give the investors an opportunity for being top managerial 
personnel no matter their nationalities. They can practice their 
responsibility of being in charge through being top managers in 
the sectors for which they are willing and believe they can bring 
the best output. Whenever the investor identifies an opportunity, 
he/she can therefore initiate the opportunity and cultivate it. 
He/he can hold the top position in initiating the idea. Also, if he/she 
believes that he/she has a better capability in managerial work in 
a certain field, he/she can engage and apply for such vacancies to 
show his/her competencies.
3.3. Dispute Settlement
BITs give the MNCs right to report any dispute that is directed to 
them. Sometimes the host government might engage unethically 
with the MNCs and thus creating differences among them 
(Swenson, 2008). BITs then issue the MNCs a chance to report 
such disputes so a control measure can be taken against that activity. 
The international arbitration will be taken into consideration with 
aplomb to solve such disputes (Swenson, 2008).
Disputes under a certain BIT are solved under the treaty between 
the parties. With indulgence, the international law disputes are well 
resolved whenever they occur. From the BITs interpretation and 
referencing of the treaty contract which they sign between the two 
warring parties during conflict resolution, a solution is arrived at.
Moreover, there is a need to inspect whether the host government 
complies with the BIT set with the MNCs and the government. 
This acts as the inspection tool for the compliance of the host 
government to the signed treaties. Disputes are resolved with the 
consideration of the treaties that was signed between parties. If 
changes are to be made to suit the parties, it should be in a form 
of agreement where the two parties disengage in the previous 
agreement and enter into a new treaty.
In 2014, there were 42 investor dispute settlements that totaled 
608 cases that have ever been solved by recognized BITs. In the 
year 2014, the significance of the BITs was fully realized through 
the resolution observed through the application of the BITs in 
international trade. For the overall concluded cases that engaged 
the BITs were 43. For these cases, 36% have been won by the 
states while 27% were won by the MNCs (Allee and Peinhardt, 
2014). It thus implies that different MNCs have recognized the 
importance of the BITs and thus they utilize the availability of 
BITs positively on resolution of differences that might up come 
between the parties (Allee and Peinhardt, 2014).
4. INVESTMENT DISPUTES AND 
ARBITRATION
The most particular component in speculation defense 
arrangements is the speculator state question settlement instrument 
(Aleman, 2013). This is the thing that makes speculation 
arrangement exceptionally not quite the same as whatever other 
settlement there may be. It sanctions peregrine financial specialists 
to arraign the host nation in advance of an arbitral tribunal on 
the off chance that they trust that the arrangement has been 
contradicted. The speculator state process endorses the financial 
specialists to challenge an extensive variety of legislative measures 
in a last and tying intervention choice (Allee and Peinhardt, 2014).
There are various special cases to BITs that are relevant inside 
various circumstances. Harten contended that inside of BITs, there 
is a special case to the guideline of standard global law that obliges 
states to speak to its nationals on the off chance that the latter has 
a case against another state (Van Harten, 2007). Be that as it may, 
peregrine financial specialists are vindicated from applying this 
inconvenient course and organization of their cases specifically. 
The most everyday components incorporate mediation under the 
support of ICSID, which offers supplemental office discretion and 
specially appointed assertion under the UNCITRAL intervention 
rules. It is through BITs that the present universal venture 
discretion framework was built up (Pesaran and Shin, 1999).
As of not long ago, Aguasdel Tunari embedded that the global 
group has seen various cases testing the host states’ fundamental 
administrative capacities and some of the time states’ 
commitment to give open facilities to its natives (Rossman and 
Helpman, 1991). By Morris Asia Inhibited, the Commonwealth 
of Australia, state administrative measures on ecological issues, 
well-being and other settlement dissemination to the occupants 
have been proclaimed illegal for peregrine financial specialists’. 
By Gas Transmission Company, the Argentine Republic, 
sometimes the fundamental capacity of the state; security, and 
peacefulness is put in peril because of unequal BITs; decisions 
have constantly gone for peregrine financial specialists (Pesaran 
and Shin, 1999).
Most of the foreign investors are very skeptical of the host local 
government and also the local investors. There are different levels 
of standards that the BITs procure to guarantee specific treatment 
of the investors (Blomstrom, 2014). Per the juridical system of 
international law, most of the host countries have to accept the 
conditions that are being offered by the MNCs considered being 
foreign investors. The presence of the BITs has a very significant 
role in the creation of efficiency of the FDI and realization of 
its effectiveness in the economy of different countries. Limited 
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evidences depict that BITs can as well act as substitution of the 
domestic institutional quality, but this doesn’t define the institution 
of quality specification on performance of its authoritative 
permissive activities (Hang, 2014).
For effective governance of the FDI, the BITs are signed in 
the essence of attracting more investors and to show how 
the countries are dedicated to invite different investors who 
might have to consider the effectiveness of the BITs and how 
the government is dedicated to collaborate (Dhooge, 2001). 
Different resources that are used in order to sign the treaties 
also create a picture of what the BITs are. The BITs protect the 
external foreigners because it has not trivial interference to what 
is considered to be important for the transaction and enforce 
what is stated.
5. THE ENCROACHMENT OF MNCS
There have been various techniques which have been formulated 
to explain the origin of the MNCs and why they are still located 
in wide range of countries. Truth be told, such techniques might 
have negative results on human rights as most consideration for 
determination of the MNCs encroachment are not well structured. 
The assets that administrations need to actualize such projects 
are all the time being refuted by their misappropriation hence; 
nations that don’t take viable measure to check such misuse are 
also negating their global human rights commitments, completely 
with respect to financial, genial, and social rights (Nagan and 
Hammer, 2013). All nations have the commitment to expand their 
assets to understand the monetary, gregarious, and social rights. 
A considerable part of the unlawful money related streams out 
of the creating nations is constituted. Kar et al. (2010) evaluated 
that around US 5.6 billion were diverted to unlawful monetary 
streams from Egypt in the period from 2001 to 2010, and 80% 
of these surges came about because of corporate assessment 
mishandling particularly through the unremarkable routine 
of exchange mispricing (Kar et al. 2010), but a great deal is 
transferred to illegal duty avoidance, considerable misfortune 
happens through lawful’ expense shirking, and truculent 
strategies to minimize liabilities. Different techniques to attack 
charges incorporate non installment of expenses through 
acquiescence with administrations, the disintegrating basis of 
engendered by moving benefits to assessment asylums (nations 
with a 0% charge rate), and also exchange pricings and other 
common practices (Prosper Makene, 2014). The misfortune that 
creating nations bring about from assessment asylums is three 
times more than what they get through peregrine profit each year 
(OECD, 2015). This predominantly happens through what is 
referred as exchange mispricing that happens when “two related 
organizations exchange with one another and misleadingly 
misshape the cost at which the exchange is recorded keeping 
in mind the end goal to minimize charges because of expense 
ascendant elements. For instance, by recording however much 
benefit as could be expected in an assessment safe house with 
low or zero duties” (Bastagli, 2015). 60% of capital flight 
from Africa is assessed to account from exchange mispricing 
(Mosselmans, 2016).
6. UNDERSTANDING WHY BITS ARE 
MNC’S SAFE HAVEN
Stiglitz verbalized that the primary reactions of these agreements 
are the way that they are not vote based and give more insurances 
to financial specialists who would be generally unattainable 
(Dhooge, 2001).
There have been an open examination which is unendingly 
checked (Stiglitz, 2007). In addition, the venture bargains have 
withal offered a lift to a sizably voluminous number of questions. 
These incorporate ambiguities in the dialect use in the settlements 
that request arrangements to give careful consideration to the 
configuration of a well-suited system for debate determination. 
The Netherlands, being the most charitable system of BITs on the 
planet, is an exemplary illustration of this. The Dutch BITs are 
famously kenned to use extremely wide illicit expressions and 
definitions. They overlook later and develop bits of knowledge 
that sweeping venture defenses welcome as “arrangement 
shopping,” where different nations have started inspecting 
and redesigning their BITs. The Netherlands sustains to pride 
them on their considerate speculation insurances, which are 
dubiously expressed and poorly characterized (Van Dijk et al., 
2006; Weyzig 2013). Apparently, the procedures for mediating 
debate have been an incredible worry to be the essential flaws 
of the bargains, where the coming of speculation arrangement 
discretion emerges, yet it was not proposed to forefend people 
in worldwide law, but rather as an odd and extraordinarily strong 
framework that forefends one class of people by obliging the 
administrations that sustain to speak to other people. On the 
opposite, the Western majority rule governments have built 
up an arrangement of norms, worried due procedure including 
models of confirmation and methods intended to augment 
the probability of a reasonable result. The question settling 
forms in BITs frequently miss the mark concerning these “best 
practices.” Interestingly, there are also sundry debate cases 
being kept a mystery that give no determination. Offers might 
furthermore be outlined, and there is no chance to get off 
determining conflicting choices; thus, since these kept debates 
are not distributed, different cases can’t expand on the point of 
reference. Hence, this prompts more skepticism and fancy to the 
choices. BITs are planned to decrease irregularity and not the 
absolute opposite. There are withal grave worries with the way 
referees are winnowed. The way authorities are selected might 
open them to undue political weight. As Van Harten contends, 
“there can be no principle of law without an autonomous legal” 
(Van Harten, 2010).
7. NEGATIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
BITS AND MNCS
There can be negative relationships between the BITs and the 
MNC MNCs. One of the major factors that can lead to this 
negative relationship is mishandling of the signed treaty between 
the two parties (Stiglitz, 2007). If the BITs don’t take fully into 
consideration of all what was in the treaty, there is likelihood of 
growth of disagreement between the two parties, considering what 
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is in the treaty should be held and practiced by the parties with no 
deviation. Moreover, there can be negative relationships among the 
parties if the BITs seek to oppress the MNCs by offering limited 
rights. On the other side, the two MNCs might deviate from the 
agreement they had with BITs (Pesaran and Shin, 1999). It will thus 
lead to the violation of the treaty and thus the relationship between 
the parties is disobeyed. If the MNCs engage in transactions 
that are not within the treaty, this is considered as violation of 
international law in the market. To maintain the relationship 
between BITs and the MNCs, international law should be observed 
by both parties and maintained. Failure to that the relationship 
between them is likely to collapse as the treaty will not be suitable 
for either BITs or MNCs (Pesaran and Shin, 1999).
8. CONCLUSION
The International Covenants on Human Rights and the Declaration 
on the Right to Development established that States are the 
essential commitment bearers of human rights and that, as a result, 
every State is expected to manage peregrine speculation inside its 
purview. It is basic to test for techniques for considering MNCs 
responsible and to manage their operations in order to benefit local 
groups and, in addition, the worldwide monetary framework. In 
such manner, the procedure includes subsisting global regulation 
executed and implemented broadly or universally. The household 
regulation inside of a given host nation is vital. The universal 
pledges on common and political rights are endorsed by numerous 
nations to force commitment on these administrations to control 
the behavior of MNCs inside of their locality, while keeping in 
mind the end goal is to maintain the standards contained inside 
of them. This is foremost to control any future misuse of BITs 
between connecting states.
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